Prohibiting BSL-3 and BSL-4 Labs in Menlo Park

April 26, 2023

Menlo Park Planning Commission and
David Hogan, Sr. Contract Planner Community Development
701 Laurel St.
Menlo Park, CA 94025
Via email: dwhogan@menlopark.gov
Cc: city.council@menlopark.gov

Subject: Sierra Club Comments on prohibiting BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs in Menlo Park

Dear Mr. Hogan and Menlo Park Planning Commissioners,

The Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter’s Sustainable Land Use Committee advocates for land use issues and the Chapter’s Bay Alive campaign advocates for the ecological health of San Francisco Bay. We are concerned about the potential safety hazards of life sciences projects situated close to residential areas and to the Bay. The Menlo Park Life Sciences District is of particular concern because it is in an area of moderate to high liquefaction susceptibility1 and one that could be impacted in the future by sea level rise. We also note its adjacency to residential neighborhoods in East Palo Alto.

We strongly recommend that no Biosafety Level (BSL)-3 labs be permitted in Menlo Park, and that BSL-4 labs also be excluded. We recommend that, if this project is approved, the permit stipulate that the facility not be equipped or permitted for Biosafety Level (BSL)-3 or BSL-4 activities, which pose the greatest risk if there is a release of dangerous, contagious organisms. We understand from comments at the Planning Commission study session on this project that Menlo Park does not currently have any BSL-3 labs. There are currently no BSL-4 labs in California.

Four biosafety levels (BSL), BSL-1 through BSL-4, are defined for all life sciences laboratories, in order of increasing requirements, to prevent harm to humans and the environment through release of a living organism (e.g., inoculated test animal, infectious agent, infected worker, accidents).2 The BSL is determined based on the inherent danger of the organism and the type of research conducted. As the BSL level increases, federally funded laboratories must adhere to increasingly stringent National Institute of Health (NIH) standards for equipment, worker protection, decontamination, waste disposal, release incident reporting, and so forth. Unfortunately, privately funded research and privately owned biotech R&D facilities, such as that proposed for 1125 O’Brien, are not required to adhere to the NIH requirements for BSL levels 1 through 3. BSL-4 labs, which work with highly lethal agents such as Ebola, should never be allowed near residential areas.

Recently, the Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter organized a webinar titled Planning for Life Sciences Development for Bay Area Cities.3 The event featured experts from the Boston/Cambridge area, a historic hub for life sciences in the US, and included biosafety experts. An important fact emerged: several cities in the greater Boston/Cambridge metropolitan area have reversed their biosafety policies to no longer allow BSL-3 or BSL4 labs in their cities, and more are joining their ranks. Some do not even allow BSL-2 labs. Please see a list of cities and links to their ordinances included HERE.
 
Why have they made these changes? With decades of experience with the industry and the growing awareness of the increasingly lethal agents used in BSL-3 “highcontainment” labs, cities are now “walking-back” from allowing the high-risk labs into their communities.4


BSL-3 “high-containment” labs involve the higher-risk pathogens that are relatively very difficult to control, as they are usually airborne and very contagious when released. They require complete dependence on mechanical systems that can fail through human error, mechanical failure or disasters5. They work better in institutions such as universities that have layers of safety oversight committees to ensure an understanding of risks, transparency, regular reporting and inspections, and biosafety procedures for worker, public and environmental safety.

Menlo Park does not have processes in place to protect residents and the environment from risks at these facilities, nor are there any other local or state regulatory agencies with responsibility for ensuring that private biotech labs do not impact the community.

  • There is no mention of biohazards, biosafety, or biosecurity in the Menlo Park Safety Element6 , in Connect Menlo7 , or in the zoning ordinance that established the Life Sciences District. The City is completely unprepared for a biohazard release incident.
  • San Mateo County Environmental Health staff have reported8 that they have no authority or responsibility for biohazard incidents, with the exception of the Coronavirus pandemic. The State hazardous materials databases, which the fire department and emergency responders depend upon, include chemical and radiological hazards but do not include biological hazards. The federal government does not regulate or oversee privately funded biotech labs and the research they do other than licensing companies to work with hazardous organisms.
  • The City’s Life Sciences zone heavily impacts the East Palo Alto and Menlo Park’s Belle Haven neighborhoods, already impacted and vulnerable residential areas and school sites, potentially endangering children and other residents with unknown infectious agents.
  • This facility would be located within a few hundred yards of sensitive natural ecosystems that affect the Bay itself. Flooding and seismic events are known hazards in this part of the Bay Area, therefore ecological impact concerns of BSL-3 labs are a critical issue.

The federal government and the scientific community are expressing increasing concern about the growth of new risky research in privately funded BSL-3 labs and the lack of oversight9. Several recent news articles have elaborated on these concerns.10 11 Without proper regulation or oversight required by the NIH or other public health agencies, allowing the proliferation of these facilities without appropriate controls presents a significant risk to public safety.

In Summary

  1. We strongly urge you to reject the establishment of any BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs in Menlo Park.
  2. With respect to the 1125 O’Brien EIR, which does not address the concerns expressed in this letter, we request that the EIR evaluate the potential impacts on human health and the environment of an accidental release of a spectrum of biological agents that would potentially be allowed based on the BSL levels that Menlo Park decides to allow for the building and that the building infrastructure will be designed to accommodate in the future. For example, if HVAC systems could be designed to include BSL-2 or BSL-3 with its positive air pressure requirements, the EIR should evaluate the consequences of a failure of that system and its impact on nearby residents and ecological receptors.

Please note that, besides biosafety, this letter does not address any of the other issues which should be reviewed regarding this project, such as impacts on the nearby communities of EPA and Belle Haven, including noise (the city’s noise standards for labs’ HVAC equipment will need setbacks greater than in Menlo Park’s current Life Sciences ordinance or sound barrier enclosures for rooftop equipment), lab lighting (requiring shades after hours for neighbors’ protection), air quality of lab exhausts, shading by tall HVAC equipment, climate action plan impacts due to requests to allow gas-fired HVAC equipment and exemption from reach codes needed for climate action plan goals, excessive water and energy consumption, and other sustainability and environmental concerns.


Respectfully submitted,

Gita Dev, Co-Chair, Sustainable Land Use Committee, Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter
Gladwyn d’Souza, Chair, Conservation Committee, Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter

Cc: Menlo Park City Council members James Eggers, Executive Director, Sierra Club Loma Prieta Chapter
Jennifer Chang Hetterly, Campaign Lead, Bay Alive, Sierra Club Loma Prieta
Dave Pine, Chair, Board Of Supervisors, San Mateo County
Ray Mueller, Board of Supervisors District 3, San Mateo County
Len Materman, OneShoreline, San Mateo County

A growing number of scientists are reconsidering the dangers of prospecting for unknown viruses and conducting other high stakes work with pathogens

1CA Dept of Conservation Regulatory Maps, CGS Warehouse, Zones of Required Investigation https://maps.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/informationwarehouse/regulatorymaps/ MTC/ABAG Hazard Map: https://mtc.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=4a6f3f1259df42eab29b35dfcd086fc8

2 Activities and projects conducted in biological laboratories are categorized by biosafety level. The four biosafety levels are BSL-1, BSL-2, BSL-3, and BSL-4, with BSL-4 being the highest (maximum) level of containment. There are additional specific rules and designations for animal research (ABSL), agricultural research (BSL-Ag), and other types of research. These other types of labs require their own specific set of rules and regulations, because they are dealing with larger organisms, such as plants, animals, and insects. https://www.phe.gov/s3/BioriskManagement/biosafety/Pages/Biosafety-Levels.aspx

3 “Planning for Life Sciences Development for Bay Area Cities,” a Webinar for Municipal Leaders, March 2, 2023

4 “The asymmetric threat posed by biological weapons will continue to increase as new tools and techniques are developed …by the society-wide economic, emotional, and government-destabilizing impacts caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, it can be argued that the total cost of this pandemic—including the loss of life and the stress to the economy—could be rivaled only by the deployment of an atomic bomb.” https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/engineered-pathogens-and-unnatural-biologicalweapons-the-future-threat-of-synthetic-biology/

5 Boston University, June 1, 2016: “A malfunctioning network switch at BU’s National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) resulted in a shutdown of parts of the lab’s ventilation monitoring system …The University has suspended BSL-3 research until the outside engineers’ review recommended remedial work to prevent future ventilation system malfunctions.”

6 https://menlopark.gov/Government/Departments/Community-Development/Planning-Division/Comprehensiveplanning/Housing-Element/2023-2031-Housing-Element-Update/Safety-Element

7https://menlopark.gov/Government/Departments/Community-Development/Planning-Division/Comprehensiveplanning/ConnectMenlo

8 In a meeting with the San Mateo County Office of Environmental Health and the Sierra Club Biosafety working group on January 9, 2023 and including San Mateo County Supervisor Pine and staff on February 2, 2023.

9 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) have formed an advisory committee, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). The NSABB has held meetings in 2022 and 2023 about Biosafety, with specific focus on Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (PC3O) and Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). In a transcript of a NSABB Sept 2022 meeting a board member notes: “We have to deal with the problem of domestic research that’s not funded by the US government. That’s a big chunk right now, especially out here in the west with Silicon Valley.”

10 You should be afraid of the next “lab leak”, NY Times Nov 23, 2021. “ In fact, the most concerning aspect about high containment biolabs is that, considered as a collective, they may only be as safe as the worst lab among them. A breach or a breakdown at one could imperil us all.”

11 “Research with exotic viruses risks a deadly outbreak, scientists warn” Washington Post, April 11, 2023.